

Bilateral Investment Treaties between of South American Countries and their Consequences at the International Level

The thesis encompasses an interdisciplinary study of political sciences and international law to analyse the international investment framework. By focusing on multilateral attempts to regulate foreign investments and on the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) ratified by South American countries with the United States and European countries like Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom, the thesis proposes that BITs weaken the relative power of developing countries at the multilateral level. Furthermore, the thesis proposes a new lens to analyse the framework, namely Susan Strange's structural and relative power theory. This lens is fruitful because the analysis of the international investment framework thereby allows not only to reject the idea of a paradox when answering the question of why South American countries signed BITs, it also provides sufficient explanations as to why the multilateral attempts to regulate foreign investment have failed, why developing countries are reacting against the foreign investment regime and why the framework for international investment is once again changing.

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